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The long-run goal of neuroeconomics is to create a theory of economic choice and exchange that is neurally
detailed, mathematically accurate, and behaviorally relevant. This theory will result from collaborations
between neuroscientists and economists and will benefit from input from other fields, including computer
science and psychology.Neuroeconomics is a combination of
mathematical frameworks, experimental
paradigms, and lab and field behavioral
data about peoples’ choices (from eco-
nomics) and measures of neural activity
(from neuroscience). The goal is to relate
mathematical theories of choice to neural
measures, to build hypotheses that con-
strain competing economic theories, to
predict effects of cognitive and emotional
factors on individual choices, and to sug-
gest when people do not always choose
what is best for them (and what good
policies follow).
How Economic Models Work
Imagine entering a bookstore looking for
vacation reading. There are an enormous
number of choices (a typical Border’s
might have 100,000). The cover art, size,
font, and heft of books all invoke sensory
processing that might influence what you
buy. Picking up a possible purchase,
memories about similar books that were
loved and hated are called up by an inter-
nal self-recommendation system. Was it
recommended by Oprah or by friends?
(Social processing kicks in.) If it’s an
unknown author, there is a vague risk
that the book is awful. If it is a hardback
by a favorite author, is it worth waiting
a while for the cheaper paperback to
save some money?
Theories in economics generally start
with the presumption that choices like
these, from different sets of books, are
consistent in special mathematical ways.
For example, if you’re holding book A
you should not then trade A for B, B for
C, and trade C back for A again (exhibiting
an ‘‘intransitive cycle’’). If you can always
make up your mind between two books,
and don’t choose in a cycle, then you
are acting as if you are implicitly assigning416 Neuron 60, November 6, 2008 ª2008 Elordered numbers to all the books and
picking the higher-numbered book.
Economists call these implicit numbers
‘‘utilities.’’ The theory of utility-maximiza-
tion says people make the best choices
given what they want, know, and can
afford. This ‘‘preferences-information-
constraints’’ mathematical framework
can be applied to a wide range of market
and political choices, including social
ones in which the choices of other people
influence a person’s behavior (game the-
ory). While utility-maximization might ap-
pear to be an implausible interpretation
of what people shopping in the bookstore
are literally thinking and doing, it makes
predictions that are correct in a wide
range of settings (e.g., when the price of
a good goes up people buy less of it),
even for many animal species.
Economists are proudly agnostic about
the neural basis of utilities: if we are un-
able to find measures of neural activity
that correlate with numerical utilities,
most economists would not abandon the
theory. Given the agnostic stance, what
can neuroscience add (Bernheim, 2008)?
Some studies will show neural circuitry
that does appear to implement utility
computation. Knowing how that circuitry
works will have some novel implications.
Such knowledge could also establish the
limits of consumers’ cognition in under-
standing the consequences of their
choices, and inform policy.
Neuroscience probably has more to
contribute to understanding consumer
decision making (demand) than to under-
standing the supply of goods, except for
some topics like how emotions, norms,
and rewards motivate workers, how job
skills (‘‘human capital’’) develop in the
brain, and how service experiences are
valued.sevier Inc.Toward a General Framework
Figure 1 contrasts neuroeconomic ele-
ments of choice with constructs in
‘‘behavioral economics’’ and standard
economics. Behavioral economics uses
psychological facts and constructs to in-
corporate limits on computational ability,
willpower, and self-interest in economic
analysis. These limits are often incorpo-
rated by adding a behavioral parameter
or process to a standard economic
model. A close correspondence between
neural activity and some version of eco-
nomic theory (including extra behavioral
processes) is already emerging—tenta-
tively, of course. The diagram suggests
at least three fundamental questions.
(1) In neuroscientific models, stable be-
havioral choice patterns are the end result
of learning; in economic models, they are
the starting point of analysis. This contrast
raises a question: when are learning pro-
cesses consistent with choice patterns
reflective of stable preferences?
One answer is that rational economic
theories probably are good approxima-
tions when choices are simple and
repeated in a stationary environment, so
that goal and decision values can be
learned. If you eat regularly at a local res-
taurant for many years and sample most
of the dishes, an unchanging menu may
become like a list of conditioned stimuli
that evoke stable valuation signals. Your
menu choices might then satisfy eco-
nomic consistency axioms to a surprising
degree. In such choices, a form of learn-
ing referred to as temporal difference
(TD) learning is often thought to apply. In
TD learning, the gap between the actual
outcome and a person’s expectation of
value, called the ‘‘prediction error,’’ is
used to adjust the estimate of goal value.
Mathematical analyses show that TD
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NeuroViewFigure 1. Neural and Economic Components of Choice
Contrasting neuroscientific mechanisms of choice (left) with additional behavioral economics constructs (middle) and basic neoclassical economics constructs
(right). Adapted from Nature Reviews Neuroscience (Rangel et al., 2008).learning can be used to learn even com-
plex goal values and strategies (e.g.,
a leading backgammon algorithm uses
TD learning).
Many studies have shown neural corre-
lates of TD learning during goal-oriented
choice. Early evidence showed that neu-
ral firing rates in midbrain dopaminergic
neurons, which project to the striatum
and prefrontal cortex (Schultz et al.,
1997), appear to encode TD error. fMRI
signals of TD errors were later found in
the striatum (O’Doherty et al., 2003). The
striatal regions are active when people
imagine possible counterfactual out-
comes (‘‘fictive learning,’’ Lohrenz et al.,
2007) and when rewards are social (Fehr
and Camerer, 2007).
TD learning will generate reliable stable
goal values,which sets the stage for show-
ing a strong ‘‘neurometric’’ correlation be-
tween measures of neural activity and the
economists’ inferred utility value of such
goods in practiced or familiar choices.
Neural firing rates from single-unit record-
ings correlate with the inferred value of
choices in riskygames (Platt andGlimcher,
1999) and with behavioral choices be-
tween different juice rewards (Padoa-
Schioppa and Assad, 2006). Other studiesshow very reliable correlations between
the strength of fMRI signals in human
medial OFC and values assigned to foods,
wine, charitable giving, and consumer
goods (Hare et al., 2008). Despite the
assertionof agnostic economists that peo-
ple only act ‘‘as if’’ they maximize utility,
these studies suggest that there really are
neural measures that deserve to be called
utilities!
However, many complex decisions are
so infrequent that convergence is unlikely
to occur through TD learning. Shopping
for books, for example, involves integra-
tion of sensory, abstract, and memory
processing, social influence, budget con-
straint, and tradeoffs about risk (new au-
thors) and time (waiting for paperbacks).
And new books are always coming out.
Choosing a house or college is even
more complex and uses abstract proposi-
tional inputs. A challenge for neuroeco-
nomics is to show what neural systems
collaborate in these types of complex,
high-stakes, slowly learned decisions.
(2) How do internal and external
constraints influence choice? The ‘‘repre-
sentation’’ box in Figure 1 includes both
external and internal constraints. In eco-
nomic theory, the typical external con-Neuron 60,straints are prices of goods (interpreted
broadly to include time and social factors)
and a consumer’s income. However, in
standard economic theory, it is rare that
any internal constraints are made explicit.
Consumers are usually assumed to
choose, given their preferences and infor-
mation, optimally and unemotionally.
However, economists have a concept of
‘‘state dependence’’ of utility—e.g., the
demand for food goes up when you are
in a hunger state. However, the states
are usually assumed to affect preferences
and are not under cognitive control.
Cognitive neuroscience could illumi-
nate the influence of internal constraints
on economic choice. An example is emo-
tional regulation. Subjects instructed to
‘‘reappraise’’ fearful stimuli in a way that
allows them to consciously dampen their
fear responses show less activity in amyg-
dala and more activity in the prefrontal
cortex (two parts of an apparent regula-
tory circuit). This cognitive reappraisal
paradigmhasbeenextended to economic
choices of risky gambles; preliminary evi-
dence suggests that downregulation of
loss aversion reduces the tendency to
avoid gambles that may yield losses and
reduces skin conductance (suggestingNovember 6, 2008 ª2008 Elsevier Inc. 417
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sponse). There are many more research-
able examples from bargaining, bluffing,
and selling. In these cases, a cognitive
process can be both ‘‘chosen’’ and then
influence valuation of choices.
(3) One of the most solid findings in the
neuroeconomicsof reward is thatdissocia-
ble systems guide three distinctly different
types of valuation: Pavlovian conditioning
systems (learning to associate a particular
conditioning cue with later reward), habit
systems, and goal-directed systems. A
basic question is how do these different
valuation systems work and interact?
Standard economic theory does not ex-
plicitly recognize these different types of
valuation (though the theory could be ex-
tended to include them). Their differences
can have important economic conse-
quences. For example, the habit system
is likely to be slow to respond to abrupt
changes, such as a sharp jump in the
price of gas. For the habit system, a sud-
den change in an item’s price requires
a change in our behavioral response that
is analogous to ‘‘reversal learning.’’ Econ-
omists do typically distinguish short-run
and long-run responses to large changes,
but this distinction is rarely linked to
details of learning and therefore has little
predictive power.
Conversely, the goal-directed valuation
system will typically involve a lot of top-
downprocessingofnumerical andabstract
concepts (or should!), such as ‘‘crunching
the numbers’’ in valuing complex decisions
(e.g., buying solar panels). This type of
processing implies that consistency of
choices is likely to be modulated by vari-
ables related to expertise, cognition, atten-
tion, and so forth.
What happens when valuation systems
conflict? Economists have approached
thisquestionusing ‘‘dual-system’’models,
e.g., one model of addiction (Bernheim
and Rangel, 2004) distinguishes ‘‘hot’’
states, in which habit rules, from ‘‘cold’’
states, in which choice is goal directed. In
the cold state, people can either deliber-
ately invest in kicking an addiction or can
take a chance on whether a hot state will
develop and result in craving. Since these
dual-system models sometimes create
analogiesbetween two typesof interacting
economic agents and two similar types of
brain processes, neural tests of them pro-
vide the most direct evidence.418 Neuron 60, November 6, 2008 ª2008 ENeural Evidence for Behavioral
Economics
Some progress has already been made in
finding neural correlates of behavioral
economics models of time preference,
social reward, strategic thinking, and risky
choice. For brevity, I will only discuss the
latter.
In standard economicmodels, gambles
have possible outcomes x with associ-
ated probabilities p(x). Gambles could
be monetary ones, like lottery tickets, or
de facto lotteries like going to college
hoping to earn more, starting a small busi-
ness, or running a quick errand without
feeding a parking meter.
A normatively appealing theory, called
‘‘expected utility,’’ is that such gambles
are valued by weighting the hedonic utility
of possible outcomes by the chances of
those outcomes actually occurring. A
modified view, called ‘‘prospect theory,’’
differs in two ways: probabilities are not
always weighted by their numerical value,
and outcomes are valued relative to a ref-
erence point. There is much lab evidence
and some field evidence (e.g., from game
shows and stock prices) consistent with
prospect theory and emerging neurosci-
entific evidence.
Choices do appear to implicitly weight
probabilities nonlinearly. Preliminary evi-
dence from Hsu et al. using fMRI shows
striatal valuation signals that imply that
a one-in-a-million chance has a neural
weight of 0.02. This process is consistent
with economic overreactions to tiny chan-
ces of blissful outcomes (e.g., winning
a lottery) and rare catastrophes (e.g.,
plane crashes).
Prospect theory also proposes that
choice outcomes have a ‘‘reference-de-
pendent’’ value v(x  r) relative to a point
of reference along with an absolute utility
u(x). The value v(x  r) is thought to reflect
hedonic adaptation to the past, or valua-
tion relative toa futureaspiration.However,
this reference-dependent component of
‘‘value’’ might be somehow related to
a learning signal (a la TD learning).
Reference dependence implies that
choices may reverse when a natural point
of reference is reversed (a ‘‘framing’’ ef-
fect). De Martino et al. (2006, 2008) find
that lateral OFC activity is correlated
with reversal tendencies across subjects,
and reversals are also less common in
autistic subjects. Another implication islsevier Inc.that ‘‘losses’’ relative to a reference point
(x < r) and ‘‘gains’’ (x > r) could have differ-
ent neural bases and implications. In-
deed, many studies with humans (and
some with monkeys) find that the pattern
of observed choices implies an aversion
to loss—losses are valued about twice
as large as equal-sized gains. This ‘‘loss
aversion’’ correlates with differential brain
activations to increased gain and reduced
loss using fMRI (Tom et al., 2007). Still an-
other implication is that owning goods
creates a reference point, so that selling
goods is a distasteful loss, which creates
an ‘‘endowment effect’’ compared to
buying unowned goods. fMRI evidence
suggests that this effect is not due to an
exaggerated valuation, but to a height-
ened sensation of unpleasant loss when
selling (Knutson et al., 2008).
These studies show how prospect the-
ory parameters, inferred mathematically
from behavior, often correlate with neural
activity in regions generally thought to be
involved in valuation judgments or learn-
ing. These neurometric correlations can
be used to make behavioral economic
predictions that can be validated by lesion
patient studies, TMS, and single-unit
recording and stimulation. Knowing how
a brain region’s activity is linked to behav-
ioral parameters also invites predictions
about how decisions would change
across the lifecycle, across genetic back-
grounds, and in response to pharmaco-
logical intervention.
Conclusion
Economists have mixed feelings about
neuroeconomics.Many think direct neural
evidence is unnecessary.Others share the
skepticism of cognitive psychologists
(and many neuroscientists) about how
rapidly techniques like fMRI will yield sur-
prising conclusions about complex eco-
nomic choice processes. Still others are
cautiously optimistic and think that explor-
ing new technologies has option value.
My view is that the largest long-run im-
pact will come from ways in which neuro-
science challenges the preference-infor-
mation-constraint framework by showing
the influence of internal constraints and
cognitive variables.
For example, part of economic theory is
the idea that inferences are often logical
andconsistent.Butneural systemsevolved
(in a series of kludges) to solve adaptive
Neuron
NeuroViewproblems. Neuroscience will show more
clearly conflicts inwhichbehavior is biolog-
ically plausible rather than logical.
To illustrate, in standard theories peo-
ple should not carewhether a probabilistic
risk is well understood or not and should
not care whether outcomes are framed
as gains or losses from a reference point
(holding their final consequences fixed).
Ironically, those two patterns are ex-
hibited most strongly by lesion patients
with lateral OFC damage (Hsu et al.,
2005) and by autists (De Martino et al.,
2008)—that is, the most ‘‘logical’’ behav-
ior is exhibited by abnormal people.
These results suggest a shift from logical
criteria for economic rationality to biolog-
ical ones.
Economic analyses take preferences
as a starting point and have little to say
about changes in preference. A deeper
understanding of genetics, learning, and
childhood development will provide
some ideas about how preferences are
related (e.g., are patient people less
averse to risk?) and how preferences for
food, violence, saving, risk taking, and ed-ucation vary across people and change
with experience and development.
What can economics do for neurosci-
ence? Economic theories supply a para-
metric language for linking choices to
components of valuation. Even better,
those ideas have been extended to social
exchange, in the form of game theory.
And as noted earlier, economists now
have several models in which two or
more types of agents interact, which can
be starting points for improved models
of multiple systems in the brain.
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